Abstract-Privacy protection is one of the fundamental security requirements for database outsourcing. A major threat is information leakage from database access patterns generated by query executions. The standard private information retrieval (PIR) schemes, which are widely regarded as theoretical solutions, entail ( ) computational overhead per query for a database with items. Recent works propose to protect access patterns by introducing a trusted component with constant storage size. The resulting privacy assurance is as strong as PIR, though with (1) online computation cost, they still have ( ) amortized cost per query due to periodically full database shuffles. In this paper, we design a novel scheme in the same model with provable security, which only shuffles a portion of the database. The amortized server computational complexity is reduced to ( log ). With a secure storage storing thousands of items, our scheme can protect the access pattern privacy of databases of billions of entries, at a lower cost than those using ORAM-based poly-logarithm algorithms.
I. INTRODUCTION

I
N database applications, a malicious database server can derive sensitive information about user queries, simply by observing the database access patterns, e.g., the records being retrieved or frequent accesses to "hot" records. Such a threat is aggravated in the Database-as-a-Service (DaaS) model whereby a data owner outsources her database to an untrusted service provider. The concern on potential privacy exposure becomes a hurdle to the success of DaaS and other data oriented applications in cloud-like settings. Note that database encryption does not entirely solve the problem, because access patterns also include the visited addresses and the frequency of accesses.
Private information retrieval (PIR) formulated in [6] is the well-known cryptographic mechanism inhibiting information leakage from access patterns. Modeling the database service as a bit retrieval from a bit array in plaintext, PIR disallows a server to infer any additional information about queries. Many PIR schemes [2] , [5] , [11] , [12] , [14] have been proposed with the emphasis on lowering the communication complexity
The shuffle-based algorithm inspired Smith et al. to design a PIR scheme [18] with communication cost and computation cost (i.e., server accesses) for periodical shuffles, where a trusted hardware plays the role of CPU in ORAM and caches a constant number of data. This hardware-based PIR scheme was further investigated in [9] , [10] , and [19] . The main algorithmic improvement was due to [19] , which proposed an shuffle algorithm. Therefore, the amortized computation complexity is where the hardware store records.
The hierarchical algorithm also has several derivatives. Williams and Sion [20] reduced the computation complexity to by introducing storage at the client side. The complexity was further improved to in [21] by using an improved sort algorithm with the same amount of client side storage. Recently, Pinkas and Reinman proposed a more efficient ORAM in [15] . It achieves complexity with client end storage. Though asymptotically superior, all these big-complexity notations carry large constant factors. The complexity of the original ORAM has a coefficient larger than 6000 and the complexity of Pinkas and Reinman's scheme has a constant factor falling between 72 and 160. Therefore, if the database is not large (e.g., ), these hierarchy based algorithms are not necessarily more efficient than the shuffle-based algorithms.
Caveat: The algorithms proposed in this paper belong to the square-root algorithm [8] family, i.e., based on shuffles. A detailed comparison between our scheme and the state-of-the-art hierarchy-based ORAM [15] is presented in Section V. In addition, we stress that the "square root" complexity of the shufflebased ORAM and our results are completely in different context. The square root solution of ORAM requires a sheltered storage storing items, which is equivalent to using a cache storing items at the client end in our setting. In fact, our scheme only uses a constant size cache and when our scheme has poly-logarithm complexity.
Roadmap: We define the system model and the security notion of our scheme in Section II. A basic construction is presented in Section III as a stepping-stone to the full-fledged scheme in Section IV. Performance of our scheme is discussed in Section V, and Section VI concludes the paper.
II. SYNOPSIS
A. System Model
The system consists of a group of users, a database modeled as an array of data items of equal length denoted by , and a database host denoted by . A trusted component 3 denoted by is embedded in . has an internal cache which stores up to data items, . No adversary can tamper 's executions or access its private space including the cache. is capable of performing symmetric key encryption/decryption and pseudorandom number generation. All messages exchanged between users and are through a confidential and authentic channel. TABLE I  TABLE OF NOTATIONS AND TERMS A PIR scheme in this model is composed of two algorithms: a shuffle algorithm and a retrieval algorithm. The former permutes and encrypts while the latter executes PIR queries. The scheme runs in sessions. The database used in the th session is denoted by , which is a permuted and encrypted version of and is also stored in 's space. Within the session, runs the retrieval algorithm to execute a PIR query, which involves fetching records to its cache. The session ends when the cache is full. Then, runs the shuffle algorithm which empties the cache and produces . Note that is never accessed by . a) Notations and Terminology: To highlight the difference between and , we use item to refer to any entry in and use record to refer to any entry in . We say that is the index of in , and use address to refer to a record's position in . A PIR query on item is denoted , and we say that is the value of . A summary of all notations and terms used in the paper is presented in Table I .
B. Security Model
In a nutshell, a PIR scheme prevents an adversary from inferring information about queries from observation of query executions. The transcript of protocol execution within a period is referred to as access pattern. We use to denote an access pattern of length . More formally, , where is an address of database and is the th record in . When can be inferred from the context, we only use to represent an access just for the sake of simplicity.
The adversary in our model is the database host which attempts to derive information about user queries from access patterns. Besides observing all accesses to its memory or hard disk, can also adaptively initiates PIR queries of its choices. Formally, we model the adversary as a probabilistic polynomial time algorithm , which takes any access pattern as the input and outputs the value of a target query. We allow to access a query oracle , through which issues PIR queries arbitrarily as a regular user and observes their executions.
Since the adversary can issue queries, we differentiate two types of queries: and . A query is stained if the adversary has prior knowledge of its value. For example, all PIR queries due to 's request to are stained ones; and an uncompromised user's query is clean. The notion of security is defined as below, similar to the one in ORAM [8] . Namely, no polynomial time adversary gets nonnegligible advantage in determining by observing access patterns including 's execution. where is a negligible function, and and denote the events that and output as the value of with the assistance of , respectively. The probability is taken over all the internal coin tosses of the PIR scheme, , and or .
C. Protocol Overview
Recall that our predecessors [9] , [10] , [19] run as follows. Before a session starts, the database is encrypted and permuted using fresh secrets generated by . During execution, retrieves the requested item, say , from the database if is not in the cache; otherwise, a random item is fetched to the cache. When the cache is full, the entire database is reshuffled and re-encrypted for the next session. The objective of database shuffles is to remix the touched database entries with the untouched ones, so that future executions appear independent with preceding ones. Due to the full database shuffle, these protocols incur computation cost. Security Intuition: Our proposed scheme is rooted at an insightful observation: the full database shuffle is not indispensable, as long as user queries produce access patterns with the same distribution. Note that it is unnecessary to shuffle white records. A white record does not leak any query information for the following two reasons. First, all records are encrypted and therefore a white record itself does not compromise privacy. Second, since it is white, there exists no access pattern involving it. Therefore, the observation that an encrypted record is not touched does not help the adversary to derive any information about (existing) user queries, which is the security goal of PIR.
Based on this observation, we propose a new PIR scheme which has a novel retrieval algorithm and a partial shuffle algorithm. In a high level, our scheme proceeds as follows. Initially, all database entries are labeled white. Once a record is fetched, it is labeled black. For a query on , executes a novel twin retrieval algorithm: if is in the cache, randomly fetches a pair of records, black and white, respectively; otherwise, it retrieves the needed record and another random record in a different color. When the cache is full, only shuffles and re-encrypts all black records, which is called a partial shuffle. Intuitively, always spots a black and white pair being retrieved for queries in a session. Moreover, the information collected in one session is rendered obsolete for the succeeding sessions because partial shuffles remove the correlations across sessions. A challenge of this approach is how securely decides a record's color and securely retrieves a random record in a desired color. Note that since all accesses to the database appear random, the black records are dispersed across the entire database. It is practically infeasible for an embedded trusted component to "memorize" all state information. A straw-man solution is that scans the database to check the colors of all records. Nonetheless, this solution is not attractive since its linear complexity totally nullifies our design efforts.
In Section III, we will present a basic PIR scheme by assuming that 's cache is big enough to accommodate the needed auxiliary data structures. In this way, we dismiss the aforementioned challenge for the time being and focus on the new twin retrieval and partial shuffle algorithms and their security. This facilitates an easier presentation of our full scheme in Section IV where we will remove this storage assumption and propose a solution to the mentioned challenge.
III. BASIC CONSTRUCTION
A. Basic PIR Scheme manages a sorted array denoted by in its cache. stores all black addresses in the ascending order. In every session, a constant number of white records are fetched. Therefore, the size of grows with a constant amount after each session. At the end of the th session, generates as the pseudorandom permutation among black addresses for the th session. We remark that is not defined upon the entire database. For two black addresses in , s.t. , , , it implies that contains the same item as in . We denote this relation as . Namely, specifies the mapping between the black addresses in and their original addresses in . An example of and is illustrated in Fig. 1 .
Initialization:
chooses a pseudorandom permutation and an encryption algorithm with a random secret key . It encrypts and shuffles into by applying and . This step can also be performed by a trusted authority which then initializes accordingly.
Session 0. executes queries using the retrieval algorithm in [19] . For , if is in 's cache, reads into the cache. Otherwise, retrieves a random record. After executions, is populated with addresses and generates a secret permutation and a new secret key . It shuffles the black records according to while leaving the white records intact. Since all records to be shuffled are in the cache, simply re-encrypts them using and then writes the ciphertexts out in a batch to generate . It deletes all data items in the cache. Note that no read access to the database is needed during this shuffle. Remark 2: generates a random white record by repetitively generating until returns .
Explanation of Algorithm 1. For a query on , runs the algorithm to fetch one black record and one white record from . The decryption of the fetched record is performed within T. If the needed item is in the cache, both records are retrieved randomly. Otherwise, it fetches the requested record for and the other one in a different color.
Note that once a record becomes black, it stays in black forever. searches to determine the color of the requested record. If it is white, directly uses its image under to read the data, since it has never been shuffled. Otherwise, uses and looks up to locate its present address in . After queries, the cache is full, where half entries are black and half are white, meaning that they are newly retrieved. Note that now has entries with newly added ones during the th session. Explanation of Algorithm 2. The partial shuffle is to remix up all black records whose addresses are in . For each partial shuffle, a new permutation is selected so that all black records are assigned to addresses randomly chosen from . Note that the reshuffle process also re-encrypts them so that the server is unable to link any black record's old address and new address.
Essentially, it is to permute those black records in into according to
. fills in following the address sequence:
and so on. The record written into may be available in 's cache; and if not, it can be found in . In the latter case, the record can be located through an address lookup, which in a high level view is through . Note that since and are defined in different domains due to the growth of , the algorithm has to make necessary address adjustment as in Steps 13 and 14. The adjustment is done by calculating which is the number of white items in the cache making the difference.
In order to prevent the server from knowing whether the record to write is from the cache or fetched from , always retrieves one record from . Therefore, if the record is from the cache, finds the next black address whose preimage under is not in the cache (as shown in the while loop) and fetches it into the cache.
B. Security Analysis
Our analysis is to show that the PIR scheme presented above satisfies Definition 2.1. Intuitively, we show that the adversary gets negligible advantage by obtaining the transaction scripts which is computationally indistinguishable from a random string of the same length. We begin with a definition of ideal implementation which dismisses those attacks on the permutations and encryptions.
Definition 3.1 (Ideal Implementation): An implementation of Algorithms 1 and 2 is said to be an ideal implementation if all permutations
are true random permutations on their respective domains and is information theoretically secure.
Let be the random variable denoting the script recording all accessed database addresses for retrieval during the th session, and let be the random variable denoting the script recording all accessed database addresses for partial shuffle at the end of the th session. Lemma 3.1 shows that the partial shuffle in an ideal implementation is uniform, in the sense that after the partial shuffle, all black records are uniformly remixed. Thus, all black records appear indistinguishable to . Then, Lemma 3.2 proves that at any time, the access patterns for all query executions have the identical distribution. Finally, we prove in Theorem 3.1 that the basic PIR scheme (without an ideal implementation) satisfies Definition 2.1.
Lemma 3.1 (Uniform Shuffle):
For an ideal implementation, Algorithm 2 at the end of the th session performs a uniform shuffle on all black records. Namely, , ,
where the probability is over all the random coin tosses in generating permutation and in query executions. Proof: We prove the lemma by an induction on the session number.
I. . In the end of the session 0, all black records are in the cache and are written out to directly from the cache. Thus, no matter what is in use, remains the same. Therefore, when is a true random permutation, the probability holds for all .
II. Suppose that (1) holds for , i.e., after the th session. We now consider the th session. Let denote the set of white addresses touched and turned into black during the th session. We use to denote the new version of the black address array at the end of the th session. To simplify the presentation, let , , and . Note . We proceed to prove that (1) be the two-dimensional random variable for the black and white addresses accessed in the twin retrieval algorithm for . Let denote the access pattern when is executed. Then, in an ideal implementation, , . Proof: Without loss of generality, suppose that is executed at the th session. We prove the theorem by examining the cases when and .
I:
. The theorem clearly holds as is a random permutation of based on . Therefore, for each instance of on , its image on is uniformly distributed. is always 0.
II:
. According to Algorithm 1, for a query , a black record and a white record are read. Let denote the set of indexes of all items in the cache, and denote the set of indexes whose corresponding records are black records and not presently in the cache, and , which is the set of indexes whose corresponding records are white. To prove the theorem, it is sufficient to demonstrate that for any , remains the same in the following cases covering all possibilities of .
• Case (0) . Both and are randomly retrieved. So
• Case (1) . reads the corresponding black record and a random white record from . Due to Lemma 3.1, the corresponding record could be in any position in with the same probability. Therefore, . is a random retrieval, which is independent of . Therefore, .
• Case (2) . reads a random black record and the corresponding white record from . The position of the white records is determined by . Therefore, . is a random retrieval independent from . Therefore, . By combining all the cases above, we complete the proof. Note that the ideal implementation is infeasible in practice. Given the limited resource has, all permutations are pseudorandom rather than true random, and is semantically secure only against a PPT adversary. Therefore, we prove below that under a practical implementation where and are computationally secure, our PIR scheme consisting of Algorithms 1 and 2 is computationally secure. The proof is based on a series of games [16] between an adversary and a challenger who simulates the setting with respect to our scheme.
Theorem 3.1 (Main Theorem):
The proposed PIR scheme satisfies Definition 2.1. Namely, for a database and any using pseudorandom permutations and a semantically secure encryption , for any PPT adversary against our scheme (Algorithm 1 and 2), there exists a PPT , such that for any target clean query , for any , for any access pattern , where is a negligible function. The probability is taken over all the internal coin tosses of Algorithm 1, Algorithm 2, , and or .
Proof: In the proof, we do not differentiate access patterns for query execution or for partial shuffle.
Game 0. Game 0 is defined as the attack game between and the challenger. Game 0 is conceptually equivalent to attack against our scheme without an ideal implementation. In particular, the challengers sets up the system and simulates using pseudorandom permutations and a semantically secure encryption scheme . queries to run tainted queries.
observes all access patterns for all queries. At certain point, asks for a challenging query denoted . The challenger randomly sets , where , and executes the query. observes its execution. Then continues to query and to observe the access pattern. After totally observing a polynomial number of database accesses , halts and outputs . wins Game 0 if . We define to be the event that
. Note that . Game 1. We transform Game 0 into Game 1 with the following changes. Instead of using pseudorandom permutations , the challenger uses true random permutations , which are on the same respective domains. All others remain the same as in Game 0.
Let be the event that in Game 1. We claim that , where is the advantage for any PPT adversary in distinguishing between a pseudorandom permutation and a random permutation over the same permutation domain. This can be easily proven by using a distinguisher attacking the pseudorandom permutation generator by interpolating between Game 0 and Game 1. To determine whether a family of permutations are true random or not, the distinguisher applies them in Game 0 and Game 1 and observes 's success probabilities in two games.
Game 2 We transform Game 1 into Game 2 with the following changes. Instead of using a semantically secure encryption , the challenger uses an information theoretically secure encryption algorithm . All others remain the same as in Game 1.
Let be the event that in Game 2. We claim that , where is the advantage of a PPT adversary in distinguishing and , i.e., breaking the semantic security of . Similar to the proof in Game 1, our claim here can be proven by constructing a distinguisher which is given oracle accesses to either or and interpolates between Game 1 and Game 2.
Therefore, we have . Thus, the theorem can be proved by proving , which is equivalent to prove that in an ideal implementation of our proposed PIR scheme, . By the conditional probability formula, it is equivalent to prove that , . Fix any session , we prove it by an induction on .
I: When , our target is to prove that , . Note that . Consider . There are two cases:
• The record corresponding to is in . Therefore, , due to the initial permutation; due to random access.
• The record corresponding to is in . Therefore, , due to random access; due to the initial permutation. Thus, in both case for both cases. Obviously, for all . Consequently, . II: (induction assumption) For . We then prove that . Without loss of generality, let , where is the th database read. Therefore, to prove , it is sufficient to prove due to the conditional probability formula. By the induction assumption, it is sufficient to prove . We prove this by considering three exclusive cases for . 1) occurs after the th database access; 2)
is the query for the th database access; 3) occurs prior to the th database access. We proceed to prove that the above equation holds for all three different cases. IV. CONSTRUCTION WITHOUT STORAGE ASSUMPTION In this section, we consider the scenario that does not have the capability for storing whose size grows linearly to the number of queries. is therefore maintained by . Note that unprotected accesses to may leak information about the black records looks for, and consequently compromise query privacy. A straightforward solution is to treat as a database, and to run another PIR query on it. Nonetheless, the cost of this nested PIR approach seriously counteracts our efforts to improve the computational efficiency.
We devise two tree structures denoted by and stored in to facilitate 's accesses on black and white records, respectively. We also retrofit the previous twin-retrieval and partial-shuffle algorithms such that the accesses to and are oblivious, since all accesses to and appear uniformly to for all query executions.
A. Auxiliary Data Structures
Here we only describe the data structures and the involved algorithms. Their construction and the security analysis are presented in the subsequent sections.
1) Management of Black Records:
maintains two arrays: and , recording black addresses as in Section III. The latter array is for to acquire session related information. When a session starts, and are identical. During the session, only is updated with every database access as in the previous scheme, and is not updated. In the beginning of a session, overwrites with which has more elements.
2) Management of Permutation:
Recall that is a result of a partial shuffle under the permutation . The permutation can essentially be represented by pairs of tuples , where is the item's index in and is the corresponding record's address in . selects a cryptographic hash function with a secret key and a The shadows in 0 implies that all nodes are encrypted.
CPA secure symmetric key encryption scheme with a secret key , where the encryption and decryption functions are denoted by and , respectively. We use to denote . Therefore, the permutation can be represented by a 2-tuple list , sorted under values, i.e.,
. Let be a complete binary search tree with randomly assigned inner node and with being the leaves such that an inner node stores satisfying that is larger than the plaintext stored in its left child and smaller than the plaintext of its right child. Hereafter, we refer to the plaintext stored in and as keys as they are used for numerical comparison. Fig. 2 depicts one toy example of with four leaves. We design three algorithms on : random-walk, targetedwalk , and secure-insert as described below.
• Random-walk: Starting from the root of , fetches a node from into the cache, and secretly tosses a random coin such that both of its child nodes have the same probability to be fetched in the next level. The process is repeated until a leaf node is fetched.
• Targeted-walk : Starting from the root of , fetches a node from into its cache and gets its key by decryption. If is less than or equal to the key, fetches its left child; otherwise, it fetches the right child. The process is repeated until a leaf node is reached.
• Secure-insert where has been sorted under values: The same as the regular insertion algorithm to a sorted list, except that all comparisons are performed within 's cache after decryption, and that are inserted into instead of in plaintext. The random-walk algorithm implements fetching a random black record, whereas the targeted-walk algorithm performs a real binary search. Both algorithms walk from the root of downwards to a leaf node, i.e., an entry in . These two algorithms are used during query execution whereas secure-insert is used in constructing .
3) Management of White Addresses: We need to manage those white records as well. The black addresses virtually divide into white segments, i.e., blocks of adjacent white addresses. We use an array denoted by to represent the white segments. An entry in has three fields, i.e., representing the th white segment which starts from the address and contains entries with being the th white address in the database. Namely, . Since does not hold any secret information, it is managed and stored by . Nonetheless, similar to the security requirement of , the notion of PIR also requires that the server cannot distinguish whether 's access to is for a random white record or one requested by a query. utilizes to fetch white records in the following two ways.
• is set to " " if was black; otherwise is set to " ." In our example shown in Table II , 's image in is currently the fifth black record in the database.
B. The Scheme
We are now ready to present the full scheme without the assumption of 's storage for . The scheme consists of Algorithm 3 for query executions and Algorithm 4 for the partial shuffle. In the high level, these two algorithms shares the same logic as Algorithms 1 and 2 in Section III-A. The differences are mainly on how to locate the black and white records needed by protocol execution and how to construct .
1) Twin Retrieval:
The main challenge of the retrieval algorithm is to obliviously and efficiently determine a queried record's color and to generate the proper random address. The basic idea of Algorithm 3 is to utilize to determine a record's color by searching for the corresponding ciphertext. If it is black, the search process outputs its exact location; otherwise, it outputs a random black record. To ensure that a leaf can only be retrieved once, stores the intervals for those retrieved leaves into a temporary set . For a binary search tree, each leaf has a corresponding interval determined by the two adjacent inner nodes in an in-order traversal. Thus, whether a leaf is retrieved depends on whether the searching key falls into the leaf's interval. Note that these two inner nodes are on the path from the root to the leaf. If the leaf is its parent's left/right child, the recorded ancestor is the nearest one such that the leaf's is the right/left offspring.
More specifically, differentiates three scenarios. In the first scenario (Line 2), the queried record is in the cache. In this case, it fetches a random black and white pair. In the second scenario (Line 8), the queried record is not in the cache and the expected search path has been walked previously, which indicates that the queried record is white. Therefore, performs a random walk in to avoid repeating the path. In the last case (Line 11), performs a targeted walk to search for ciphertext . There are two possible outcomes: the leaf node matches , indicating that the desired record is black; or the leaf does not match, indicating that the record is white.
Algorithm 3 The General Twin Retrieval Algorithm in Session
, executed by .
INPUT: a query on , , key , set , whose root is . OUTPUT: . where are the plaintext of leaf 's parent node and one of its ancestors on the path and .
18: read the and . After decryption, create two new entries for them accordingly. Note that the BIndex is empty for the time being.
19: return to the user.
2) Partial Shuffle:
The partial shuffle algorithm shown in Algorithm 4 is the same as Algorithm 2 with two main differences. First, uses to look for a suitable black record to shuffle out (Line 7), rather than repetitively visiting . Therefore, for every write to the new database, only has one access for and one for the old database (Line 11). Second, this algorithm has to construct and . When populating the black entries in the new database (Lines 15 and 20) , secure inserts the mapping relation into . Note that it is which is inserted into sorted . The concurrence of constructing and filling the new database does not leak information, since -values of are exactly the addresses in array .
The construction of is also straightforward. Since is built as a complete binary search tree with being the leaves, its topology of is calculated when is ready. Thus, can scan and build : between two adjacent nodes, randomly picks in the domain of and builds an inner node storing . Then, based on the computed tree topology, sets the pointers for its two children, which could be inner nodes or leaf nodes. 23: end for 24: write the remaining records in the cache to and assign accordingly; securely discard .
Algorithm 4 Partial Shuffle
25: scan and construct based on .
C. Security Analysis
Our security analysis below focuses on the new security issues caused by using the auxiliary data structures. First, we prove that the adversary's observation on a path of targetedwalk does not reveal any information about the query. Note that for a binary search tree, a leaf node exactly represents one search path. We describe the obliviousness of targeted-walk using the following lemma.
Lemma 4.1: For any given and constructed as above, for a search path ending at resulting from targeted-walk on a query , for all and . Proof: To prove the lemma, it is sufficient to prove . Without loss of generality, suppose that an in-order traverse of shows to the adversary that Therefore, it appears to the adversary that is exactly the probability that , which depends on the hash function and the decryption function . Under the random oracle model, is uniformly distributed in 's domain. Therefore, is determined by . Since are uniformly distributed and the adversary has no information about as every is only chosen once in query execution, for all . Lemma 4.2: Suppose that is a true-random permutation over . For any given , for all white item , the search path generated by the targeted search for has the same distribution as a random search, where the probability is computed over the coin tosses of and in random search.
Proof: The proof is very straightforward. Since is a true random permutation, is a random position among all white records. Thus, has the same distribution as which is just the rank of a random white record. Therefore, the two binary searches above result in the identical distribution.
The two lemmas above show that the independent executions of those component algorithms for auxiliary data structures do not leak information to the adversary. Next, we prove that Algorithm 3 and Algorithm 4 remain as oblivious though auxiliary data structures are accessed within their executions. In plain words, we show that an adversary does not observe more useful information in executing Algorithms 3 and 4 than in executing Algorithms 1 and 2.
Lemma 4.3: The accesses to auxiliary data structures in Algorithm 3 are oblivious.
Proof: For all queries, only and are accessed. In addition, the black addresses stored in are known to the adversary. Thus, accesses to do not give the adversary any advantages.
By Lemma 4.2, we have shown that for all queries, the accesses to in executing Algorithm 3 have the identical distribution. Furthermore, the trace of searching on does not leak extra information to the adversary. This is because the entire is known to the adversary. For a binary search, the leaf determines the search path. Therefore, since the adversary observes the access to a white address in the database, it can generate the same trace as does.
The adversary also observes a retrieved black record and a search path from either targeted-walk or random-walk. Since the accessed black record's address can be inferred from the root-to-leaf walk in , we only evaluate whether a tree walk leaks more query information than the touched black address. According to Lemma 4.1, the execution of targeted-walk in Algorithm 3 has the identical distribution for all queries. In addition to that, random-walk has the same path distribution as targeted-walk since every leaf node still has the same probability to be fetched. Therefore, neither tree walk algorithms leaks information about the query except the address of the black record to retrieve.
To summarize, the accesses to in Algorithm 3 do not leak more query information to the adversary than in Algorithm 1.
Lemma 4.4:
The accesses to auxiliary data structures in Algorithm 4 are oblivious. Proof: Algorithm 4 performs a full scan of . Since only contains black addresses which can be derived from database access pattern, the full scan of does not leak extra information. The algorithm also reads in Line 11. This does not leak extra information, since the adversary can find by observing that is fetched. The construction of (including ) involves a comparison between the keys stored in two nodes. Although the adversary gets the topology of which reveals the order of all keys, the construction process does not leak more information than itself. In fact, leaks no more information to the adversary than she has observed. The -values in are exactly the same as those in , which can be easily obtained by observing the database retrievals. All other information in are the ciphertext of keys. Although shows the order of all keys, it does not expose the permutation used in the partial shuffle. This is because all keys in 's inner nodes are randomly picked, and all -values in are derived from . To summarize, any access pattern observed by the adversary can be caused by all possible permutations with the same probability. Thus, the accesses to do not leak more information to the adversary than in Algorithm 2.
The lemmas have shown that accesses to auxiliary data structures leaks no additional information than in the basic construction. Since both the full scheme and the basic one have the same database access patterns for the query execution and partial shuffle, Lemma 3.1 and Lemma 3.2 still hold in the full scheme, which leads to the following theorem as in proving Theorem 3.1.
Theorem 4.1: For a database and any corresponding shuffled and encrypted database using pseudorandom permutations and a semantically secure encryption , for any PPT adversary against our scheme (Algorithms 3 and 4), there exists a PPT , such that for any clean query , , for any access pattern , , . The probability is taken over all the internal coin tosses of Algorithm 3, Algorithm 4, , and or .
V. PERFORMANCE
A. Complexity Analysis
Our scheme has an communication complexity, which is the same as that of schemes in [9] , [10] , and [19] , and is the lower bound of communication complexity for any PIR construction. The computational complexity describes the amount of accesses on , including database accesses (e.g., read and write), auxiliary data structure accesses. Note that queries are executed in every session. When the th session starts, holds black records. Therefore, one query execution of Algorithm 3 costs accesses due to the task of binary searches on and . A partial shuffle at the end of the th session permutes black records. It requires accesses to scan array , accesses to permute the records, accesses in average for constructing , accesses for constructing . Therefore, totally queries executed in sessions costs server operations, which is approximated to Therefore, the complexity of the amortized server computation cost per query is , which is independent of the database size.
The advantage of our scheme decreases when asymptotically approaching . One optimization is to reset the state when is large. A reset is to run a full shuffle on the original database which costs accesses using the full shuffle algorithm in [19] . Let be the parameter such that the database is reset for every sessions. Then, the average amount of accesses is
We choose an optimal , which satisfies that , such that the optimal average cost becomes Thus, the complexity of the average computation cost per query after optimization is . A comparison of our scheme against other PIR schemes is given in Table III. Note that all previous hardware-assisted   TABLE III  COMPARISON OF COMPUTATION COMPLEXITY IN TERMS OF THE AMOUNT OF  SERVER ACCESSES schemes [9] , [10] , [18] , [19] claim computation complexity since they only count the cost of database accesses. In fact, all of them require operations to determine if an item is in cache. Our scheme also has database read/write, though we need an additional cost for a binary search in . For those PIR schemes without using caches, the computation cost per query is at least . Our scheme substantially outperforms all other PIR schemes in terms of average query cost by paying a slightly higher price of online query processes.
B. Comparison With Hierarchy-Based ORAM
We also compare our scheme with the state-of-the-art ORAM proposed in [15] (denoted by PR-ORAM). The comparison is made upon several aspects including computation complexity, the actual computation cost, the protected storage cost, and the server storage cost. 1) Complexity. Clearly, the complexity of our scheme is much higher than the complexity of PR-ORAM and other hierarchy-based ORAM constructions. 2) Actual Computation Cost. According to [15] , the constant factor in the big-notation of PR-ORAM's server operation complexity is about 72 if two optimization techniques are applied. (Otherwise, it is about 160 according to their experiments.) Therefore, it takes operations per query. The average cost of our scheme with optimization is . By conservatively setting , our scheme outperforms PR-ORAM's operations when as shown in Fig. 3(a) . Note that a popular trusted hardware, e.g., IBM PCIXCC, typically has megabytes storage, which can accommodate thousands of items. It is more suitable than PR-ORAM for databases of up to billions of items. 3) Protected Storage. Both our scheme and PR-ORAM need a protected storage whose size is independent of the database size. In our scheme, the hardware needs a cache to store a constant amount of data items. PR-ORAM also needs a client end storage to store secret information. Since it does not store data, it requires less storage than our scheme. 4) Server-side Storage. In our scheme, the server storage grows with query executions. At maximum, it stores the database of items, two arrays and of size , a tree (including ) of nodes, and an array of . Therefore, the maximum storage cost at the server side is at maximum, in contrast to the server storage in PR-ORAM. 5) Architecture. Although we introduce a trusted hardware in the server side, the algorithms proposed in this paper can also be applied to client-server settings as ORAM-based PIR. We remark that to solve the PIR problem, both our scheme and ORAM require a trusted entity. In the tightcoupling architecture considered in our scheme, a secure hardware is the one, which supports multiple clients and has faster database accesses. In the loose-coupling architecture as suggested in [21] , a client/agent plays the role of trusted party. Note that the choice of architecture does not affect the complexity of the algorithms or the number of server operations.
C. Experiment Results
We have implemented Algorithms 3 and 4 and measured their computation time cost with a simulated trusted hardware. Both algorithms are executed on a PC with a Pentium D CPU at 3.00 GHz, 1-GB memory, and Ubuntu 9.10 86_64. They are implemented by using OpenSSL-0.9.8 library, where the permutation is implemented using the generalized Feistel construction proposed by Black and Rogaway in [4] .
Our experiment is to verify our square-root performance analysis in Section V-A. We fix the cache size as 512 items and experiment with databases of five different sizes. For each database, we ran 100 000 random generated queries with full-shuffles after a fixed amount of sessions. We measured the average query time in each experiment. The results are shown in Table IV below, and are plotted in Fig. 4 . Fig. 4(a) depicts the up-and-down of the partial shuffle time, where the drop is due to the protocol reset. Fig. 4(b) depicts the average query execution time growing almost linearly with which confirms our analysis above.
VI. CONCLUSION
We have presented a novel hardware-based scheme to prevent database access patterns from being exposed to a mali-cious server. By virtue of twin-retrieval and partial-shuffle, our scheme avoids full-database shuffle and reduces the amortized server computation complexity from to where is the number of queries, or to with an optimization using reset. Although the hierarchy-based ORAM algorithm family [15] , [20] , [21] can protect access patterns with at most cost, they are plagued with large constants hidden in the big-notations. With a modest cache , our construction outperforms those poly-logarithm algorithms for databases of entries. In addition, our scheme has much less server storage overhead. We have formally proved the scheme's security following the notion of PIR and showed our experiment results which confirm our performance analysis.
